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Introduction 
 
According to financial professionals, from institutional investors to “alternative” portfolio 
managers
3
, agriculture is more and more presented as an emerging asset class (Chen et al., 
2013). The arising of such assets is based on fundamental
4
 and financial analyses by investors 
which all tend to underline the very same driving factors: “Strong long-term macroeconomic 
fundamentals; attractive historical returns on land investment; a mix of current income and 
capital appreciation; uncorrelated returns with the equities market and a strong hedge against 
inflation” (HighQuest Partners, 2010).To take advantage of these different trends, there are 
various investments’ options: commodity future contracts or index funds/exchange traded 
funds
5
; public or private companies’ equities related to agriculture6; farmland and agricultural 
property (Goldberg et al., 2012).  
 
This interest from financial industries in agricultural value chains is not totally new. In the US 
for instance, it is estimated that institutional investors, especially long term institutional 
investors such as pension funds or university endowment funds, possessed 27% of the 
country’s farmland in 2007 (GlobalAgInvest, 2012). However, its spread towards new 
geographical regions, (Latin America - beyond Brazil and Argentina -, as well as Asia and 
increasingly in Africa (Land Matrix, 2013)) seems to announce a new wave of agricultural 
investments. This renewed investor dynamic towards deeper integration of agriculture must 
be related to “the multiple food-energy-climate-finance crisis” (Margulis, 2013) which, inter 
                                                 
1CIRAD, UMR Art-Dev & University of Pretoria, Post-graduate school of agriculture and rural development; 
antoine.ducastel@cirad.fr. 
2CIRAD, UMR Art-Dev & University of Pretoria, Post-graduate school of agriculture and rural development; 
ward.anseeuw@cirad.fr. 
3 See, inter alia “Farmland: Yield-starved investors go back to the land”, Euromoney, January 13, 2014;  
4 Based on macro-economic data (i.e. growing world population, rising incomes in the developing world, etc.) 
5 A commodity future contract tracks a specific commodity; an exchange-traded fund track a basket of agricultural 
commodities (Goldberg et al., 2012) 
6 South Africa’s Public Investment Corporation (PIC), which manages the “Government Employees Pension Fund”, holds 
significant positions in the country’s bigger agro-food listed companies (Tiger Food, Woolworths, etc.) (Greenberg, 2009); 
Silverlands fund, a London-based private equity fund owns 30,2% of Crookes Brothers – a major corporate venture engaged 
in primary agricultural production in South and Southern Africa (Crookes Brothers, 2013) 
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alia, drove a sharp increase of commodity prices and pushed financial investors toward 
“emergent” and/or physical asset classes.  
 
The African continent tends also to be more and more integrated by financial markets.  In 
fact, since these crises, new narratives and representations are being spread around the 
African resilience to the financial crisis and the sharp continental projections regarding both 
economic and demographic growth
7
. As shown by Vallée (2011), this change in perception 
has been largely fuelled by financial industry actors, such as the McKinsey global Institute or 
the Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (EMPEA)
8
, through their own surveys and 
indicators. In the same time, a full range of African financial service providers, from rating 
agencies to portfolio managers, have been established with the aim to support these expected 
financial flows. These innovations are not passive responses to the demand from investors 
looking for opportunities on the continent, but rather emanate from African actors playing an 
active role mediating demand and offer. As such, they select and structure the African 
investment offers on one hand, raise and channel the international and/or national demands on 
the other hand. In addition, they play a key role by converting capital and resources from 
these two different arenas. Through their actions, these African intermediaries set up the 
instruments and cognitive frameworks of these “emergent” markets and assets (Bessy and 
Chauvin, 2013).   
 
In this paper, we will try to understand how an emerging group of South African 
intermediaries are currently trying to shape, or reshape, farms and others segment of the 
agricultural value chains as an investment opportunity for institutional investors, i.e. as an 
asset class. We define an asset as any value recognized as such by financial markets. To get 
such recognition, a particular good, service or activity must be framed to fit with the financial 
market requirements and values. An asset is based on specific beliefs, that it can generate a 
positive cash flow in the future, preferably outperforming the average profits on financial 
markets, and is liquid enough (Orléans, 1999); and on specific devices, this it can be evaluate 
and compare to others thanks to standardized benchmarks. This financial valuation (Vatin, 
2013) is not a natural given but rather produced by particular actors or group of actors in a 
specific social environment.  
 
Focusing on this emerging sub-financial industry, i.e. the investment funds and companies 
dedicated to agriculture and agro-industries, we will analyze the concrete strategies and 
instruments mobilized to “unlock” this financial value9. These “pioneers” face a multifaceted 
mediation as a “financialisation mediator” (Morales and Pezet, 2010) between global 
investors in one hand, local agricultural sector on the other hand. By analyzing their daily 
management, their interactions with investors, farmers, workers and government, we aim at 
understanding the mechanisms of diffusion of “financialisation” (Kadtler & Sperling, 2002; 
                                                 
7 For instance both Time magazine and The economist have run out covers on “Africa rising”; Time magazine, November 
2012 and The economist, December 2011  
8 McKinsey Global Institute, Lions on the move: the progress and potential of African economies, 2012; EMPEA, Global 
limited partners’ survey. Investors’ views of private equity in emerging markets, 2013 
9 In its presentation an investment fund specialized in South African agriculture states that “The objective remains to not only 
become the most successful food producer in SA, but almost more importantly, the most valued food producer” 
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Epstein, 2005; Weinstein, 2010; Fine, 2012).This particular financial channel is still new-
flanged and thus narrow, at the margin within South Africa and Africa’s agricultural 
financing. However, in our view such innovations are an interesting case study for the 
financialisation debate as an attempt to expand the financial markets’ realm.  
 
South Africa has lately seen a significant development of financial vehicles servicing in 
agriculture, offering a set of market professionals and instruments which suit these 
innovations (Ducastel et al., 2011). In addition, it is often considered as a stepping stone for 
Africa in particular through the expansion of its companies in search for new markets (Hall, 
2012), so the African scale will sometimes have to be considered. 
 
A last point needs to be clarified: the category of assets we are talking about and the frontier 
of these categories. In the financial industry, a trend toward a deeper specialization on an asset 
basis is observable. For instance, in the US financial industry some managers are only 
servicing in farmland and agricultural property investment or even in a specific crop 
(Goldberg, 2012). However, our South African sub-field doesn’t seem to be structured on 
such basis, and -in our view - it is still possible to speak about agriculture and agro-industries 
as a unique asset class, or rather a tangle of assets. Indeed, investments in agricultural 
commodities, public and private shares or farmland in South Africa seem to be driven by the 
very same dynamics. In addition, as mentioned before, the financial sub-industry specialized 
in agriculture is still narrow with intermediaries often offering a full range of 
services/investments. Unless specified more precisely, when we refer to agricultural asset, it 
includes the different investment’s options (e.g. commodities, equities, and properties). 
 
The paper will start by a general characterization of the financial vehicles servicing in South 
African agriculture focusing on the interactions between investor(s) and manager. Then, we 
will detail the production process of an emerging asset class, the South African farms, 
distinguishing the mitigation of the specific sectorial and national risks and constraints, the 
production and the management of the information flow and the neutralization’s attempts of 
social “interferences”. Finally, the conclusion will try to contribute to the financialisation’s 
academic debate by considering in particular the political dimensions of such process. 
 
1. Investment funds/companies in South African agriculture and agro-industries: 
the structuration of new financial channels 
 
Academics (Daniel, 2012), cooperation agencies (FAO, 2010) and media pay more and more 
attention on the emergence and development of financial vehicles investing in African 
agriculture and agro-industries. Such funds raise capital on financial markets and channel it 
toward investment opportunities which they identified, building progressively an “asset 
portfolio”.  
 
These structures are usually split into various legal entities, sometimes located in different 
countries, with capital flowing through them. For instance, a funding vehicle established by 
European or North American investors, might be registered in Mauritius, having its managing 
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body in South Africa and investing in all Southern Africa. Because of this multiple 
positioning and the opacity which often surrounds such activities, investment funds and 
companies operating in South African agriculture remain a misunderstood phenomenon.   
 
These entities are specialized financial vehicles grouping limited partner(s), the investor(s), 
and a general partner, the asset manager. In order to better understand these financial vehicles 
as well as their diversity (from a structural as well as strategy and activity point of view) it is 
important to detail both investor’s and asset management’s construction and trajectory as well 
as the relationships and interactions between these two actors. 
 
On the investors’ side, those currently investing in South African agriculture and agro-
industries include institutional investors
10
,i.e. public or corporate pension funds (Public 
investment corporation –South Africa-, the pension fund Pensionskassernes Administration –
Danemark-), endowment funds (Vanderbilt University endowment), fund of funds, insurance 
companies (Old mutual, Sanlam) or commercial banks (Rand Merchant Bank). We also found 
development financial institution (e.g. the African Development Bank, Proparco, the 
European Investment Bank) but also private foundations (e.g. “Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa”) and Family Office. The source of the capital, mainly related to their 
liability structures (Aglietta and Rigot, 2009), weighs significantly on the investment policy, 
and thus on their choice and expectations regarding agriculture. For instance, pension funds 
are looking for long term and stable return investments to reward their subscribers, while 
endowment funds focus on a diversification of their asset classes which are not correlated 
with one another (Campbell, 2011).  
 
These investors differ also in objectives, as development finance institutions try to archive 
returns for their shareholders and developmental goals in terms of poverty reduction or 
economic redistribution. Either national (e.g. Norfund from Norway, CDC from UK), 
regional (e.g. African Development Bank) or multilateral (e.g. International Finance 
Corporation), they provide “long term finance for private sector enterprises in developing 
countries” (Daniels, 2012) through a private operator (OXFAM, 2012) and accept smaller 
financial returns.  
 
These investors entrust their capital to a managing company, which is the implementers of the 
projects. These companies claim a field experience and a deep network with countries/regions 
they invest in. Through the valorization of such “indigenous capital”, they affirm their 
essential role as gateway to the country or the region and its agricultural value chains. Indeed, 
they are at the margin between this indigenous capital on one hand, and a financial capital on 
the other hand (Dixon, 2012); between “the bush” and the “financial industry”. As they 
handle non-formalized and non-benchmarked assets, a diversity of managing entities compete 
each other in this structuration process to sell their specific product and capture the investor’s 
flows. As such, although still narrow and still representing an emerging financial sub-
                                                 
10 An Institutional investors can be defines as “a specialized financial institution collectively managing contractual saving 
plans for a third with specific risk, performance and maturity goals”; Aglietta and Rigot, 2009 
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industry, there are several managers operating in the South African agricultural value chains 
who differ from a project and strategy point of view (Oakland Institute, 2012). Considering 
their profiles and trajectories, we note companies’ staff with different backgrounds and from 
different areas. Firstly, we identify a group with a previous experience in a development 
financial institutions involved in Africa (CDC group, FMO, Development Bank of Southern 
Africa) as investment officers, investment analysts or portfolio managers (e.g. Phatisa). 
Secondly, another group comes from South African financial industries but with a full range 
of specialties: insurance, private equity (e.g. Old mutual, PSG group), some of them being 
specialized Black Economic Empowerment vehicles. Indeed, private equity and venture 
capital are more and more promoted as an instrument of economic redistribution in the post-
apartheid South Africa (KPMG & SAVCA, 2013).Thirdly, these managing companies 
mobilize an agribusiness expertise to “feed the pipe” of investment’s projects. Thereby, they 
integrate staff from agro food national or international leading firms (e.g. Unilever, Afgri, 
etc.). According to their staff’s career paths, managing companies implement different 
practices and strategies. They also position themselves on various financial sub-fields and 
asset class, mobilizing different networks of investors and argumentative registers to convince 
them; indeed, one would emphasis on the “consumption boom” in Africa, while the other one 
would stress on food security issues. 
 
An investment fund or company is basically the alliance of these two types of collective 
actors, the manager and the investor(s), each with their own interests and beliefs. Usually, the 
manager initiates the fund’s project, defines its mandate and then raises capital from potential 
investors; but a couple of investors, especially DFIs, have also launched a tender for a 
manager with a specific mandate
11
. The concrete aspects of the investment vehicle, the 
structure of the fund in one hand, its strategy and practices on the other hand, are then 
specified through negotiations between the parties and formalized into an investment policy 
and a shareholders agreement. 
  
Such agreement reflects the balance of power between these actors. Indeed, according to the 
number, the profile and the size of investors seating on the board, but also to the track records 
of the manager, the balance of power and the room of manoeuver of the actors change. The 
alignment of interest and the respect of the investment policy by the manager are major 
concerns for the investors. Indeed, the trust, which is the legal structure of most of the fund, 
gives them few control means a posteriori (Montagne, 2006). That’s why investors protect 
themselves through a set of legal and technical mechanisms: manager’s financial 
participation, side letter
12
, external audit, remuneration system by profit sharing
13
, 
implementation of an advisory committee
14
, framing of the investments by quotas, etc. But 
investors cannot formalize everything in the fund’s legal status and managers often empower 
                                                 
11 e.g. the African Agriculture Fund 
12 This is an agreement between the fund manager and an investor that outlines different terms that will apply to this 
investor’s investment into the fund, giving him some flexibility to go outside the terms of fund legal document 
13 The manager’s remuneration standards in the private equity industry are usually referred as 2/8/20: 2% of the asset value 
under control as management fee; a hurdle internal rate of return fixed at 8%; and 20% of benefits as profit sharing.  
14 Usually, the first round shareholders and the bigger ones are sat in this committee which supports the management team, 
ensures the investment thesis and check the budget; but it doesn’t participate to the investment decisions.   
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themselves in the daily practices. For instance, managers usually take advantage from the 
diversity of investors by arbitraging between their expectations
15
. 
 
Looking at funds and investment companies operating in agriculture and agro-industries in 
South Africa, a set of relevant aspects can be identified, illustrating the diversity of such 
vehicles: 
 
- The status of the financial vehicle, which determines the life span of the fund and the 
asset class focused on. So far, most of the vehicles we identified are private equity or 
venture capital entities which buy equities in public or private companies
16
 related to 
agriculture (farms, inputs producers, agricultural financial services’ company, etc.). 
We distinguish private equity fund with a limited life span, from 7 to 12 years in 
average
17
 (e.g. Futurgrowth Agri fund, Agri-Vie) from holding companies and private 
investment company which are immortal entities (e.g. AgriGroup). Usually, funds are 
reserved to professional investors as they know this specific industry and are able to 
immobilize their capital during the fund life-span. Conversely, a few specialized 
companies are listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) with public 
shareholders (e.g. Zeder
18
). Then, some promoters are currently developing a listed 
vehicle exclusively dedicated to agricultural property, a real estate investment trust; 
but so far such project has not been fully materialized.    
- The “frontier” of the investment company mandate. As an alternative asset, 
investments into South African value chains are often managed by a specialized 
manager who builds a full portfolio of this asset class. But sometimes generalist funds 
or emergent/frontier market funds also invest in this category driven by a 
diversification strategy (e.g. Abraaj group, Emerging Capital Partner). The 
geographical mandate is also variable and funds can focus on one country (it is the 
case of several funds active in South Africa), on one region (Southern Africa), on the 
entire continent, or on an unclear “frontier market” scale19.  
- The stage of investment is also varying significantly, as is illustrated by the difference 
between “brown” or “green” fields’ investments or “core” and “conversion” 
strategies
20
 (Goldberg et al., 2012), indicating the ”maturity” of the asset and the set of 
instruments which will be mobilized
21
. However, because of the actual low 
competition around South African and African agricultural assets, but also because of 
the short-term evaluation on asset profitability by investors, managers focus mainly on 
                                                 
15 Expected in one case, all the funds we investigate have several investors from at least two different countries; most of them 
have both different private investors and development financial institutions as shareholders  
16 With public companies investment funds or companies pursue a private equity over-taking strategy by removing the shares 
out of the stock exchange (Burch and Lawrence, 2012); it is for instance currently happening with AFGRI which has been 
acquired by AgriGroupe. 
17 A bit longer than “standard” private equity funds which life spans comprised from 5 to 7 years (Daniels, 2012).  
18 Zeder, a public holding company on the JSE launched in 2006 by leading asset management company PSG, is currently 
managing four agribusiness portfolios ranging from primary production in Zambia –Chayton- to the seed industry –Agricol- 
(Zeder, 2013) 
19 Such funds rather than plan a strategy on a geographic scale are focused on markets’ trends.   
20 “A core strategy invests in currently producing agricultural land in highly productive areas”, while “A conversion strategy 
targets non-producing properties or low-yielding land in marginal areas” (Goldberg et al., 2012) 
21 Private equity industry is subdivided between venture capital, growth capital, distressed capital, etc., each ones with its 
own know-how and technics. 
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investment already “mature”, i.e. a good financial track record, a confirmed 
management team, a global exposure,  a listing on a stock exchange
22
. 
- The strategic allocation and the diversification strategies:  
o Among asset classes (equities, commodities on Futures market, farmland and 
agricultural infrastructures);  
o Along the value chain (either in one segment -e.g. fertilizers, farms, retailers- 
or with a value chain’s approach, with sometimes explicit targets for each 
segments);  
o Among productions and crops. Certain funds have an investment charter 
emphasizing certain focuses and sectors, or preventing managers to invest in 
specific sectors such as tobacco or timber (e.g. Agri-Vie). When they invest in 
primary production, they often balance between “a sheer asset strategy”, which 
is invested in one specific crop (e.g. cash crop) and a “flex crop and 
commodities” strategy (Borras, 2013) with different crops on the same farm 
during the year or from a year to another one.  
- The land ownership. When they invest in primary production, many investment 
companies and funds consider farmland as the central component of the investment 
and land price increase expectations are integrated in their cash flow model. But 
African and South African farmland can be a risky asset as witnessed by the recent 
mobilizations around large scale acquisitions in Madagascar (Andrianirina-
Ratsialonana et al, 2011) or in Mozambique (Oakland Institute, 2011); so others 
dedicate only to out-growers schemes and/or nucleus estate models without large-scale 
land acquisitions (e.g. African Agriculture Fund).  
- The management of the targeted companies. When they buy equities in private or 
public agribusiness corporates, funds or holding companies take either a minority or a 
majority stakes. According to their shareholding, they play a more or less active role 
in the daily management of the acquired firm. In others words, they can either appoint 
a new CEO and a management team or just monitor the operations through non-
executive members on the board company.  
- The “impact investment” component. Some funds implement, often on request of the 
development financial institutions, social and environmental performance standards 
(e.g. IFC’s performance standards) and investment charters -including for instance 
land policies, or exclusion lists- or join sometimes impact investing networks (e.g. 
Global Impact Investing Network). In addition, for vehicles funded by the IFC, there 
exists a “redress and compliance mechanism” for people affected by these investments 
(i.e. Compliance advisor/ombudsman).To control such developmental dimensions, 
these investors implement monitoring procedures and managers often to report 
annually on key indicators (job creation, BEE rating, etc.). For the African Agriculture 
Fund, the promoters of the fund have developed an independent technical assistance 
                                                 
22 Such « financial bias » in the selection process benefits to the most “financialized” farms and agricultural firms in Africa 
and South Africa: the African Agriculture Fund purchased the Zambian company Golden Lay in 2012 from the Abraaj 
Group, another private equity firm; Zeder bought its farms in Zambia through the acquisition of Chayton capital, a private 
equity fund.    
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facility which should encourage the integration of small scale farmers and local 
communities.    
 
Rather than a unique financial channel toward African agriculture, these investment 
companies and funds are diverse, built around a plurality of the investor/manager relationship. 
However, they are all engaged in the same production process of a specific asset class. In such 
process, managers play a key role at the interface of two different arenas. 
 
2. Toward the production of the asset: from South African farms to financial 
investors 
 
As we have defined in the introduction, an asset is any value recognized as such by financial 
markets. Such financial value relies on an active work of shaping and promoting by 
intermediaries which aim to attract financial flows. This work can be described as a 
translation process from a particular good, service or activity inserted in a specific 
environment to a reliable and sustainable investment for financial markets and actors. For this 
translation, intermediaries will mobilize a set of techniques and instruments (Lascoumes and 
Le Galès, 2005). Such production process is embedded in a broader social and political 
environment. Indeed, the ability to mobilize these instruments relies on specific policies and 
social structures historically and spatially situated.  
 
South African and African agricultural value chains seem to be currently the object of such a 
translation attempt. Therefore, the production of an emerging asset class through the specific 
case study of South African farms will be analyzed focusing on the intermediaries’ role. Three 
different modalities of such translation can be identified for this research, but concomitant to 
the reality: firstly, intermediaries have to manage the characteristics and constraints 
surrounding agriculture production to “unlock the value”; secondly, they must build an 
information flow toward investors which relies on recognized standards and benchmarks; 
finally, this shaping work is faced with social, political and cultural resistances which 
managers have to deal with. 
 
A. South African farms as a liquid, profitable and predictable bundle of assets 
 
To be recognized as an asset, that is a financial value, a good or an activity must be 
considered as liquid (Orléans, 1999) and generating a predictable positive cash flow by 
financial markets. (South African) agriculture faces several inherent risks (e.g. natural risks, 
international markets volatility, etc.) which historically discouraged private investments 
because of its random returns. So, to attract financial capitals, managers have to build a stable 
and positive cash flow in one hand and to increase the liquidity of their farms on the other 
hand.  
 
The mitigation of agricultural risks relies on the mobilization of specific instruments, which 
are “ a set of rules and procedures, more or less coordinated, which govern interactions and 
behaviors of actors and organizations (…) provide a stable framework of anticipations which 
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reduces uncertainties and structures collective actions” (Lascoumès and Le Galès, 2005). For 
our case, we identified different instruments which seem to play a crucial role in the asset 
production process in the South African farming sector: 
 
- In 1996, with the Marketing Act, the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) is 
created, i.e. a futures market which substitutes the previous regime’s agricultural 
commodity price regulatory and marketing boards (Vink and Van Rooyen, 2009). 
Such « market-based price risk management » (Newman, 2009) allows agricultural 
value chain actors to hedge the sales/purchases of their products, reducing the 
uncertainty around the price without State interventions. In addition, this futures 
market creates a centralized and standardized informational flow available to the 
public. A good example thereof is the system of the silo receipt which guarantees the 
amount and the grade of the grain delivered. These innovations have led to new actors 
to engage in the agricultural sector by creating a demand for future trading services in 
a sector where the “single channel fixed price” model was the norm. These new 
“market players” have acquired an increasing role in the sector’s restructuration until 
involved themselves in primary production investments.  
- These financial flows toward agricultural value chains also benefit from the 
international and national legislations in favor of free movement of capital (Ashman et 
al., 2011). Indeed, these funds are often split into various entities or special purpose 
vehicles, registered in offshore financial centers and protected by international laws. 
Thereby, Mauritius is becoming a hub for investments both in Asia and Africa thanks 
to an incentive tax policy
23
 and a set of bilateral double taxation agreements
24
.  
- Financial flows to (South) African farms are also boosted by the involvement of 
Development finance institutions, national and international, both at the financial and 
the technical levels. Firstly, in several funds servicing in South African and African 
value chains, DFI’s are shareholders (e.g. Proparco, FMO, DEG, OPIC, African Bank 
of development, DBSA, IDC, etc.). They often implement innovative financial 
mechanisms to leverage private capitals, by accepting a deferred profitability or by 
promoting specific securing instruments, i.e. the “master contracts of guarantee”25 
from the World Bank’s “Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency” (MIGA) or the 
“Secondary Fund”26 implemented by the IFC (Daniels, 2012). Thirdly, they are also 
active as agricultural and agri-business support services through training sessions or 
technical assistance facility (e.g. African Agriculture Fund). Fourthly, they play a key 
role in the promotion and the organization of such financial industries in Africa; for 
instance the World Bank Group supports the creation and the development of the 
“Emerging Market Private Equity Association” (EMPEA) and its regional subsidiaries 
(e.g. Southern Africa Venture Capital Association).  
- In the post-apartheid South Africa, investment companies and funds benefit from the 
structuration of the South African farm market. It is a secured and dynamic market 
                                                 
23 For instance, the Mauritius’ regime for global business company (GBC1 regime) offers a harmonized corporate and 
income tax of 15% and tax free on dividend. 
24 Mauritius and South Africa are bound by a bilateral double taxation agreement signed the 20th July 1996  
25 Specifically dedicated to Private Equity, this master contract is an insurance against political risks in emerging markets 
26 This secondary Fund “provides an exit option for emerging markets limited partner investors” (Daniels, 2012) 
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based on individual property deeds with a freehold which is constitutionally 
guaranteed. In addition, water rights for agricultural purposes are also freely 
exchangeable. Such securitization of land and water rights support a specific 
conception of the farm as a “bundle of assets” (Capron, 2005) which characterized the 
firm’s design in the financial industry, especially in the private equity industry. The 
farm is considered here as the sum of independent assets: property deeds, water rights, 
a “biological asset” –the soil-, and a flow of commodities –grains-. Each asset would 
be marketable, so managers “unlock” value from these farms through “bundling” and 
“de-bundling” strategies. For instance, they could either implement mergers and 
acquisitions between various farms or externalize the real-estate asset by selling and 
renting back the farmland. 
- Then, to mitigate the natural risks (flood, drought), fund managers utilize either multi-
peril/risk crop insurance or geographical diversification. The insurance ensures the 
production against all natural risk inherent to the agricultural activity. Geographical 
diversification relates to the acquisition of farmland in different areas in the country 
with different agro-ecological characteristics. As for the diversification of the “optimal 
investment portfolio” theory (MacKenzie, 2006), well known in finance, the objective 
is to dissolve the specific risk from one asset by a global mitigation in the portfolio 
based on the complementary  between assets and the returning force to the mean 
(Aglietta and Rigot, 2009). 
- They develop “network organizations” (Goldberg et al., 2012) to manage their farms 
and their other assets. Indeed, they tend to gather either several farms and/or different 
activities along the value chain, enabling economies of scale as well as facilitating 
management and risk control. Firstly, input costs (seeds, fertilizers, insurance, etc.) are 
reduced, since they are sourced centrally and then allocated between the units. 
Secondly, labour on the farms tends to be both contracted and salaried. The contractor 
can either be a service provider, paid per task in cash or in kind, or lease the land for 
an annual rent, becoming the owner of the crop. Such model aims at externalizing the 
risks of agricultural operations as well as covering the depreciation of the equipment. 
In this process, the farm’s staff, at least the top positions such as the farm managers, 
can also be hired directly with the objective to get a better control over the operations. 
A hierarchic salary scale is then established and includes financial bonuses, in cash or 
as share cropping. These practices transform radically the status of the South African 
farmers, becoming employees, managers or contractors/service providers. 
- Finally, to ensure the efficiency of this centralized management and to reduce the 
natural risks, such investment funds and companies rely on the utilization of advanced 
technologies, often imported from other geographical areas or sectors (e.g. 
Argentina
27
): no till farming, precision farming, satellite monitoring, soil analysis and 
correction, etc.  
 
Managers mobilize a set of devices from different sectors and areas. They largely benefit from 
the post-apartheid reforms in the agricultural sector (Vink & Van Rooyen, 2009) and more 
                                                 
27 For the Argentina, see the “pool de siembra” (Guibert & Sili, 2009) 
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broadly in the economy (Marais, 2011; Mohamed, 2009). But they are also capitalizing on 
technical, managerial and financial instruments and know-hows coming from the private 
equity industry (Champenois, 2011).  By combining these different instruments, they tend to 
create a predictable and fluid environment suitable for the involvement of the financial 
investors. As Chen et al., claim about US, “Farmland was a value due in part to farm policies, 
technology, crop insurance as well as commodity prices, and macroeconomic measures”. The 
value of South African farmland, from a financial perspective, derives from this specific 
“agencement” (Callon et al., 2007).  
 
B. The production of the information flow: farms as a standardized and 
benchmarked asset 
 
A financial asset is also a set of standardized benchmarks with key indicators on its 
“historical” returns, on its variance and covariance (the beta) or on the market risk premium. 
Such benchmarks allow institutional investors to compare and evaluate their profitability and 
their complementarity in their portfolio. This “commensuration”, i.e. “the translation of 
different qualities into a common metric that can support, for instance, decision-making” 
(Styhre, 2013), is a central part of the managers’ work to attract financial capitals. In our case, 
managers apply the standards of financial analysis on South African agriculture from the 
specific “agencement” we described before.  
 
These benchmarks and calculations are borrowed from the corporate finance analysis and aim 
at modeling a specific investment on the medium/long term through a cash flow. This 
accounting framework introduces the value of time in the valuation of transactions and assets 
(Chiapello, 2005). The production of this information flow is a central part of the fund 
managers’ role and success as they endeavor to translate a specific environment/investment 
into “global financial language”. Indeed, the managers’ skills and dexterity to deal with these 
models and implement it toward new activity areas are central issues in their competition to 
channel capital flow from institutional investors. Once validated by the investor(s), they guide 
the managers’ action and constitute the benchmarks of their evaluation. 
 
This modeling is largely based on the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model which actualizes 
in present value an investment cash flow on a discounted period (Dufumier, 1996). This 
financial evaluation is realized before any investment, and re-actualized regularly during the 
project’s life-span. It is used as support both to the decision by the manager/investor whether 
the investment is profitable and to the evaluation criteria by investors in the asset markets. It 
is a representation device of the productive world as well as a control device (L’Italien et al., 
2011) 
 
This DCF model is built on a set of assumptions regarding the discounted period which 
include macro-economic projections (i.e. inflation rate, interest rate, taxes) and market data 
(i.e. price of commodities and inputs). Indeed, such actualization of a farm’s assets is down 
either according the market value, when such value is available (e.g. agricultural 
commodities), either through an actualization of future income streams (Chiapello, 2005). The 
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“present value discount rate” is used to discount or actualize a future cash flow in present 
value. Such rates are built on market conventions regarding the future; but it is also specific to 
each fund or company as it corresponds to a particular vision of the environment. Indeed, it 
takes in consideration the political risk of a specific market. With this model, managers 
diffuse a new valuation of risk, between macro-economic and financial parameters, which 
differs, between others, from row macro-economic indicators (Vallée, 2011). In addition, by 
valuating farms as a sum of assets, such financial instrument supports the specific design of 
corporate as a “bundle of assets”. However, DCF engineers face different challenges 
according to the asset class they try to model.  
  
The utilization of the DCF model is not new in agricultural primary production, particularly 
for the cash/grain crop sectors, of which the characteristics fit well with this modeling. Firstly 
because the seasonality of such agricultural productions give a predictable character to the 
operations/schedule (planting, fertilizing, spraying, harvest) and, therefore, the costs (seeds, 
fertilizers, irrigation, labour). Secondly, there are futures contracts on such agricultural 
commodities and so the selling prices can be planned and guaranteed. For these specific 
crops, the “translation” work has not been too complex, which could explain why cash crops 
remain the main target for the financial investors. Today, fund managers in the South African 
agricultural sector seem to look for a broader application of such calculation in order to attract 
investors to other agricultural productions. For instance, several are currently applying this 
framework to cattle production, implemented by themselves or through agencies’ 
consultancy. But so far the valuation of cattle remains on productivity per capita or per 
hectare without any possibility to build a dynamic cash flow model which constitutes a limit 
to drain financial capital
28
.  
 
Finally, this DCF model reflects also the relationship between managers and investors as it is 
produced through intense negotiations (Boussard, 2013). On one hand, the discount rate is 
built in a competitive environment where managers try to attract institutional investors who 
are looking for specific financial products (i.e. risk/return profiles, covariance, etc.) and 
specific benchmarks. For instance, in some cases, foreign investors impose to express these 
calculations in their specific currency (e.g. dollar). Sometimes, they request other market 
references for the DCF calculation, e.g. the Chicago Board of Trade grain prices rather than 
the SAFEX prices. On the other hand, managers are directly interested by such internal ratios 
as their evaluation and their remuneration are based on it.  
 
As noted, this standard modeling is primarily used by investors to arbitrate between different 
investment opportunities, in agricultural value chains but also between different asset classes. 
Managers specializing in South African agriculture participate actively to the double 
movement of deepening the financial market, by the inclusion of “hybrid goods” (Aglietta and 
Rigot, 2009) as new asset classes, and connecting the different national markets, by the 
production and diffusion of worldwide recognized benchmarks (Vallée, 2011). 
 
                                                 
28
 Interview realized in the framework of this research, May 2013 
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C. Beyond modeling:  “neutralization” and “de-politization” of the asset 
 
A financial asset is structured on a standard flow of modeling and calculation. But to unlock 
the financial value, asset promoters have also “to conform” the social reality to these flows. 
Indeed, managers undertake a “neutralization”, or a “de-politization”, of the farms in order to 
fit it into the “bundle of assets” conception. Such work is particularly visible when they have 
to deal with social or political issues surrounding their farms as they often have to face actors 
or group of actors who embody and defend other, often incompatible, conceptions of the 
farmland value. It produces sometimes a distortion and a diversion of their approach and can 
interfere with the managers’ relationships with the investors. Such confrontation sheds light 
on the political dimension of the production of an asset and how the “ferryman” (Morales and 
Pezet, 2010) manager turns into a political entrepreneur. 
 
Beside other, a concrete example from the field is the case of occupiers on the farms. During 
the apartheid era, farm workers, particularly in the Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal 
provinces were allowed to live on the farm they worked on as “labour tenants”. In 1997, the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act
29
 conferred formal residential rights to these (former) 
workers and their families. This act includes a set of rights and duties for these “occupiers” 
and for the owners (e.g. security of tenure, access to service, no commercial use of the land, 
an income under the prescribed amount of R5000) but leaving a margin of maneuver to the 
two parts to negotiate and organize their daily cohabitation (Sibanda and Turner, 1999).  
 
One of the funds investigated acquired several farms with occupiers
30
. Gradually, such 
cohabitation generated tensions between the new farm owners and the occupiers
31
. The 
question of occupiers progressively interferes between the American investor and the South 
African manager in the fund. Indeed, the investor was more and more anxious about this 
concern, seen as a potential source of mobilizations and contestations either from the 
occupiers themselves or from national (e.g. Nkuzi Development Agency) and international 
coalitions (e.g. Via Campesina, Oakland Institute) focusing on this topic
32
. 
 
The fund manager tried to implement different strategies to “clean” what he considered to be 
its best asset”. They started by realizing an identification/registration of all the occupiers and 
their family on the farms and introduced a code of conduct which all occupiers should sign. 
They also implemented a “livestock permit” to register the different owners and a three steps 
warning system in case of abused from the occupiers. Then, they proposed to remove all 
occupiers to another piece of land, outside the farm, with official property titles. But occupiers 
refused such proposition arguing that this land was far away from services and useless for 
grazing. Then, facing the increasing concerns from the investor, the manager proposes to 
                                                 
29 RSA (Republic of South Africa). Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. Pretoria. Government Printers. 
30 Most of the farmers in the eastern part of South Africa have to deal with these occupiers’ issues. 
31 These occupiers own cattle who graze on the farm and managers accused them to put them on their grazing land, 
threatening their cattle by disease contamination. Then, the access to their family graves, situated outside of their area, 
became also a tension source when the manager trying to control and regulate this access.  
32 This concern regarding investors’ reputational risk was particularly strong after one of the investors in Southern African 
agriculture, Vanderbilt university endowment, was targeted by an activist campaign against land grab (Oakland institute, 
2012) 
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group these farms and to list it as property fund on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. They 
argue that in such a case, the international investor would become one shareholder among 
others of a listed fund. Such strategy aims to dissolve the individual responsibility of the 
investor into the collective ownership of the market
33. Regarding the manager’s perspective, it 
allows him to keep the control over the operation on one hand, and to balance the investor’s 
power on the other hand. Such proposition was reject by the investor by virtue of its asset 
allocation strategy, so finally the manager had to sell these farms. 
 
This example illustrates some of the difficulties faced in the translation process between an 
international investor and a local manager, and misunderstandings that may arise. While the 
manager attempts to valorize its indigenous capital to minimize such issue, investor seems 
more concerned by reputational risk, especially in its home country. Such a gap reflects the 
different positioning of these actors and gives a concrete example of the intermediation’s 
difficulties.  
 
Secondly, through the implementation of various initiatives and policies to regulate the 
presence of occupiers on farmland (e.g. code of conduct, livestock permit), fund manager tend 
to become a political entrepreneur. In fact, to “unlock the value” of agricultural asset they 
have to mitigate the political and the social issues surrounding farmland and agriculture in 
South Africa. Indeed, they push for a “disembeddedness” (Polanyi, 1983) of their farms to 
materialize the “bundle of assets” conception. Paradoxically, even if they claim a purely 
financial approach through the “asset-fiction”, they find themselves engaged in particular 
forms of “cross-regulation” (Bessy and Chauvin, 2013) alongside other public and private 
actors.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Even if African/South African agriculture still represents a minor asset class, investment 
funds and companies focusing on them are diverse. Their structures, their portfolio and their 
strategies vary. This paper explained this diversity by focusing on the specific interactions and 
balances of power between investors and manager portfolios 
 
Such innovations are spatially and historically situated. Indeed, theses financial vehicles 
mobilized specific institutions and instruments at the national (e.g. tittle deeds, water rights) 
and international (e.g. bilateral double taxation agreements) levels, and from financial 
industries (e.g. “bundle of assets” conception). From this specific configuration, or 
“agencement” (Callon et al., 2007), managers are able to implement financial analysis tools to 
produce a standardized informational flow. By producing these recognized benchmarks, 
managers allow institutional investors to evaluate these agricultural assets and potentially 
integrate it in their portfolios. But these benchmarks are not enough to produce an asset and 
managers also try to “neutralize” the political and social issues related to agriculture and 
                                                 
33 Thereby, the financial markets’ notion of “public” challenges the notion of “public good” as a use by those who live or 
work on it.     
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farmland in South Africa by “extracting” the farms from their social fabric. Even if they claim 
a purely financial and corporate approach, they find themselves engaged as political 
entrepreneurs. 
 
By considering financialisation through the production of a new asset class in the South 
African agriculture and agro-industries, we are able to shed light on a number of 
financialisation process characteristics: 
 
- Firstly, financialisation is a mediation or translation process which often relies on 
mediation chains. For instance, the development of South African investments funds 
and companies into local agricultural value chains seems to be partly a stepping stone 
toward the rest of the continent. Such intermediaries take advantage from their 
interstitial position. Indeed, by becoming “brokers in financialisation” (Bierschenk, 
2000) they get resources and legitimacy in their specific fields
34
. However, we have 
also seen a “bottom-up financialisation”, as it is not a one way process but rather the 
product of daily interactions and negotiations between actors with diverse interests and 
values, which take place inside specific institutions or organizations (Kadtler and 
Sperling, 2002).  
- Through this mediation, investment funds and companies import techniques, 
instruments as well as narratives and representations from others cultural, professional 
or geographical arenas (e.g. DCF model, no-till farming, “bundle of assets” conception 
of the firm etc.).  
- The financialization process is largely supported by both State(s) and multilateral 
institutions involvement, especially through a specific kind of parastatal organizations, 
the financial development institutions. Firstly, such innovations are broadly sustained 
by specific policies and instruments (i.e. SAFEX, international treaties, MIGA etc.) 
which increase the financial value of African agricultural assets. Secondly, there is an 
important transfer of employees and managers between public development 
institutions and private funds which create a private-public network. Thirdly, through 
DFI investments as well as public pension funds (Greenberg, 2010) or sovereign funds 
(Cotula, 2012), there is a substantial public flow fueling such dynamic. Public 
development support takes on multiple forms but all converge toward the promotion 
of an African agriculture asset class and its inscription on the developmental agenda.  
- Financialization processes also produce abstractions and categories. For instance, an 
asset tends to reduce a good, a service or any other human or natural activities to 
financial parameters and transform a farm as a “bundle of assets”, becoming a 
“fictitious commodity” (Polanyi, 1983) or a “fictive capital” (Jessop, 2007). The 
“brokers in financialisation” are also engaged in boundaries’ drawing. As for the 
“emerging market” for instance, they try to create their own asset class, or category, 
which matches with their position in the financial industries. South African agriculture 
and agro-industries are still fuzzy asset categories in structuration and from one 
                                                 
34 Many former white « commercial farmers » in South Africa hit by the land reform programs or the post-apartheid 
concentration process (Vink & Van Rooyen, 2009) have benefited from the development of these specialized funds and 
companies becoming agricultural managers or consultants for them.  
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intermediary to another such categories cover different goods, services, properties or 
activities.  
- Financialisation implies a valuation process. Indeed, an asset is a particular value. As 
we have seen such valuation must be understood as an evaluation and a valorization 
(Vatin, 2013) which rely on standardized benchmarks recognized by the financial 
markets. This commensuration (Styhre, 2013), i.e. the translation in a common metric, 
is a support for the decision-making but this is especially a comparison tool as an asset 
acquires a value only compared to others.  
- Finally, we raised the political dimensions of such financialisation process at different 
levels (Linhardt and Muniesa, 2011). Firstly, with its particular abstractions, for 
instance the asset-fiction, financialisation tends to produce an alternative 
representation of the social reality through its “representative devices of the productive 
work” (L’Italien, 2011), i.e. standard, benchmark, category or modeling. The 
financialisation’s spokesmen, the intermediaries, tend to diffuse such narratives and 
instruments which are progressively take in by other actors from other fields. 
Secondly, in some situations asset managers raise tensions in their attempts to produce 
an asset and impose their specific and exclusive conception of value. In such case, as 
with the occupiers, they clearly become political entrepreneurs, implementing 
“corporate policies” or collaborating and negotiating with different actors in order to 
protect, or increase, the asset value. Thirdly, by channeling and allocating this capital 
flow toward specific projects, they push and legitimize a specific form and conception 
of agriculture and food production, and therefore specific actors, to the detriment of 
others (Ortiz, 2008). Indeed, we note new alliances between these investment 
companies and funds on one hand and the leading South African agribusiness actors 
(e.g. Afgri with AgriGroupe or Crookes Brothers with Silverland) for their expansions 
to Africa.  Such alliance will probably tend to reinforce their domination (Greenberg, 
2009) and further the small scale agriculture’s marginalization in the continent.  
 
Since South African agriculture as a financial asset is relatively new-fangled, more time is 
needed to better understand the implications of its development. So far, we have seen that the 
translation process is not a long quiet river with several funds practicing in dire straits with 
many of their activities not being profitable or even collapsing, particularly in other, less well-
established African countries (Anseeuw and Boche, 2012). Others are adapting, implementing 
innovative schemes aiming at considering up- and downstream opportunities and constraints.  
 
The attempts to integrate African and South African farms in the financial markets as an asset 
class illustrate the cognitive and political work asset categories undergo. However, in this 
specific case such works are probably more visible because of the political and social 
conceptions and representations around farmland in South Africa. Polanyi (1983) had already 
shed light on the “land-commodity fiction” which was an attempt to subordinate land to the 
industrial society needs. However, he underlined “society’s self-protection” movement which 
curbed such dynamic. Today, is this “land-asset fiction” fully materializing through the 
subordination of farmland to the financial society needs? 
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